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I
INTRODUCTION
Our current transplant regime is a qualified failure. Transplant operations
have been basically flat for the last eight years. In 2013, over 4300 people died
while waiting and about 3000 were permanently removed from the queue
1
because they developed a medical condition that precluded transplant.
Twenty-seven years ago, the average wait for a deceased-donor kidney in
the United States was about one year; now, the average wait is approaching five
2
years. In many parts of the country it has reached a ten-year wait from listing to
3
transplant—if one can survive that long.
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1. Health Res. & Servs. Admin., National Data Reports January 1995–May 31, 2014, ORGAN
PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp
(last visited Sep. 7, 2014) (When accessing this source, in “Choose Category,” input “Waiting List
Removals,” and in “Choose Organ,” input “Kidney.” In “Step 2,” follow “Removal Reasons by
Year.”).
2. Fred P. Sanfilippo et al., Factors Affecting the Waiting Time of Cadaveric Kidney Transplant
Candidates in the United States, 267 JAMA 247, 249 (citing a median of 11.3 months), available at
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=394408; see also Jackie Carr, New Clinic Offers
Access to Shorter Wait List for Kidney Transplantation, UC SAN DIEGO NEWS CTR (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://ucsdnews.ucsd.edu/archive/newsrel/health/02-18ShorterWaitList.asp (citing a five to seven–year
wait in 2010).
3. See Benjamin Hippen, Preventive Measures May Not Reduce the Demand for Kidney
Transplantation. There Is Reason to Suppose This Is Not the Case, 70 KIDNEY INT’L 606 (2006); Robert
M. Merion et al., Deceased-Donor Characteristics and the Survival Benefit of Kidney Transplantation,
294 JAMA 2726 (2005); Akinlolu O. Ojo et al., Survival in Recipients of Marginal Cadaveric Donor
Kidneys Compared with Other Recipients and Wait-Listed Transplant Candidates, 12 J. AM. SOC’Y
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Maximizing deceased donation, although a worthy effort, is not a definitive
solution to the organ shortage. Of the roughly two million Americans who die
annually, only 10,500 to 13,800, representing less than one percent of all deaths
4
each year, possess organs healthy enough for transplanting. Moreover, when
unaware of the preference of their loved ones, only about half of families give
5
permission for the organs to be retrieved at death. The number of deceased
donors in 2012 as reported by the United Network for Organ Sharing
6
(UNOS)—about 7400—is consistent with these realities. The built-in constraint
on the number of potentially transplantable posthumous kidneys also
7
underscores why a “presumed-consent” law is unlikely to yield the huge
windfall of transplantable kidneys that would be needed to solve our organ
8
shortage. More is needed.
In order to address the organ shortage, its cause must first be determined.
The woeful inadequacy of organ-procurement policy lies in its ideological
bedrock: the notion that altruism—that is, sacrifice without expectation of
material reciprocation or enrichment—is the only legitimate motive for
donating an organ.
Bearing this cause in mind, solving the organ shortage becomes an
achievable task. The remedy to the shortage lies in modifying the de facto
9
enrichment ban. This is not as difficult as it may at first seem, because the de
facto ban, even if purportedly justified by altruism, is not as cemented in actual
law as its proponents claim. To be sure, the law as it is currently understood
10
does ban donor enrichment. But, as explained below, full prohibition is
unsupported by the relevant statute, which, accurately understood, should

NEPHROLOGY 589 (2001).
4. Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United States, 349
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 667, 667 (2003); Sherry L. Murphy et al., Deaths: Final Data for 2010, NAT’L
VITAL STAT. REP., May 8, 2013, at 1, 5.
5. Sheehy, supra note 4, at 667.
6. COMM. ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ORGAN
DONATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 100 (James F. Childress & Catharyn T. Liverman eds.
2006); see Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Organ Datasource, ORGAN PROCUREMENT &
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/organDatasource/ (last visited Sep. 7,
2014).
7. A presumed-consent law is a law that presumes all individuals to be organ donors at death
unless they explicitly indicate otherwise.
8. Kieran Healy, Do Presumed Consent Laws Raise Organ Procurement Rates?, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1017 (2006). Furthermore, although European countries with presumed-consent (also known as
opt-out) policies did enjoy a boost in cadaveric-kidney supply after the policy was implemented, it is
unclear whether their success was due to the new policies itself or to the simultaneous investment made
in procurement infrastructure. To be sure, a presumed-consent strategy has merit. Another plan known
as “forward” payment (wherein individuals arrange to have their organs taken at death in exchange for
a payment to their estate or family) is also worth considering, but is beyond the scope of this article.
9. See generally WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY
DONORS (Sally Satel ed., 2008).
10. Jed Adam Gross, Note, E Pluribus Unos: The National Organ Transplant Act and its
Postoperative Complications, 8 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 145, 179–80 (2008) (quoting S. Res.
251, 98th Cong. (1983)).
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prohibit only bargained-for commercial exchanges. The statute should not
prevent states from providing reasonable, noncommercial, gratuitous incentives
to organ donors.
11

Figure: Patients on the Kidney Waiting List vs. Annual Transplant Operations

Before explaining why donor enrichment is not fully prohibited by law, a
brief reminder of the stakes is appropriate. Consider this scenario: A goodSamaritan donor shows up at his local transplant center offering a kidney to the
next person on the center’s list. He passes all the screening tests, signs consent
forms, and undergoes surgery. His act allows a debilitated person to resume his
or her full, active role as a spouse, parent, and worker. The donor is nothing less
than someone’s savior. Under current law, however, if he accepts some kind of
tangible benefit for his act, he is considered a criminal. Even if the largesse he
receives—perhaps a contribution to his retirement account, a generous tax
credit, or in-state tuition for his child (or perhaps payments to defray burial
costs if he donated at death)—does not come from the patient whose life he

11. See Health Res. & Servs. Admin., Current Waiting List, Candidates, Overall by Organ, ORGAN
PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp
(in “Choose Category” input “Waiting List,” select “Candidates”; in “Step 2” follow “Overall by
Organ.”) (last visited Nov. 18, 2008); Health Res. & Servs. Admin., U.S. Transplants Performed: Jan. 1,
1988–Dec. 31, 2013, Kidney, All Donor Types, ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION
NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp (in “Choose Category” input
“Transplant,” in “Choose Organ” input “Kidney.” In “Step 2” follow “Transplants by Donor Type”).
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saved, but from a federal or state government, the standard interpretation of
the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) is that the donor has violated the
law. Likewise, no matter that a noncash reward would not appeal to a person in
desperate need of financial help who would want quick money rather than a
delayed in-kind reward. Never mind that a months-long waiting period would
dampen impulsivity, allowing ample time for any potential donor to undergo
detailed education about the procedure, in addition to careful medical and
psychological screening. Not to mention that participants in a donor-enrichment
program would receive quality follow-up care, a form of protection that the
current system does not guarantee to donors. And forget that the general
climate of opinion regarding donor compensation as revealed in polls is
12
generally positive. Regardless of all these factors, the prevailing impression of
section 301 of NOTA is that it prohibits any and all enrichment, even if the
enrichment is offered as a gratuity by the state rather than by the patient.
In this article, we conclude that section 301’s proscription against “valuable
consideration” should not prohibit state-government programs providing
reasonable incentives for organ donation. The prohibition ought only apply to
activity that is clearly and definitely commercial. All else, ideally, should be
allowed.
We recognize, nevertheless, that there would likely be limits to the amount
and structure of a state benefit for organ donation beyond which a reasonable
person would believe an organ to be given in exchange for the payment of the
state benefit—in other words, that a business-type inducement occurred, akin to

12. Polls and surveys reveal four trends: (1) among the general public, the majority either endorses
in-kind donor rewards or is neutral, (2) the number of people who report that incentives make donation
appear more attractive to them outnumber those who say that an incentive option would make them
less likely to donate, (3) youthful cohorts are more receptive to incentives than their older counterparts,
and (4) the public is more amenable to the idea than are medical professionals. See Satel, supra note 9,
at 154–57; see also REASON-RUPE, PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY: MARCH 2012 TOPLINE RESULTS (2012),
available at http://reason.com/assets/db/13327728509738.pdf; Karise Carrillo, Examining Attitudes on
Organ Donation for Transplant: Amenability to Financial Incentives and Donor Benefits, 3 MCNAIR
SCHOLARS RES. J. 1 (2010); Scott D. Halpern et al., Regulated Payments for Living Kidney Donation:
An Empirical Assessment of the Ethical Concerns, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 358 (2010); Harry L.
Humphries et al., Framing the Gift of Life: An Empirical Examination of Altruism, Social Distance and
Material Incentives in Non-Directed Kidney Donor Motivation, 31 J. NEPHROLOLOGY SOC. WORK 20
(2009); J.D. Jasper et al., Altruism, Incentives and Organ Donation: Attitudes of the Transplant
Community 42 MED. CARE 378 (2004); S. Leider & A.E. Roth, Kidneys for Sale: Who Disapproves, and
Why, 10 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1221 (2010); Ken Resnicow et al., Development of a Scale to
Measure African American Attitudes toward Organ Donation, 17 J. HEALTH & PSYCHOL. 389 (2012);
J.R. Rodrigue et al., Stimulus for Organ Donation: A Survey of the American Society of Transplant
Surgeons Membership, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2172 (2009); Alison J. Wellington & Edward A.
Sayre, An Evaluation of Financial Incentive Policies for Organ Donations in the United States, 29
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 1 (2011; Scott Hensley, Poll: Americans Show Support For Compensation of
Organ Donors, NPR (May 16, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/05/16/152498553/
poll-americans-show-support-for-compensation-of-organ-donors. By 1991, the subject of the organ
shortage was sufficiently familiar for a CNN–Time Yankelovich poll to ask people what they would do
if they “or a close relative had a fatal disease that could possibly be cured by the transplant.”
CNN/Time Yankelovich, “The Ethical Questions of Organ Donation,” survey conducted June 4–5,
1991. Fifty-six percent of respondents say they would “purchase the necessary organ or tissue.” Id.
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a clear commercial activity. Our purpose is neither to argue for or against the
validity of such a limit nor establish its boundary, if it exists. Rather, our
purpose is to assert only that a state benefit made within the bounds of
reasonableness and given as a gratuity or incentive crafted to underscore a
noncommercial, public-policy purpose should not be barred by NOTA. We
suggest specific features of a benefit program that should insulate donations
from being designated as commercial.
In reaching the conclusion that NOTA should not ban incentives outright
(particularly not state incentives), we interpret the actual text of the 1984
13
NOTA and then consider the Act’s legislative history and the policy concerns
that motivated it, as well as interpretive canons, federalist principles, and
interpretations by other pertinent entities. Our analysis of the legislative history
and policies behind NOTA section 301 shows that NOTA’s prohibition was
meant to protect against monetary commercial exchanges, such as those
between patient–buyers, donor–sellers, and profiteering middlemen.
Government disbursements that are intended as gratuities or incentives
advancing a public-policy purpose fall outside the language and intent of
NOTA section 301(a). Moreover, state benefits easily address concerns
originally raised during the debate over inserting the section 301(a) ban. Statebenefit programs should therefore not be prohibited under NOTA.
We find further support for this less restrictive view of NOTA section 301 in
the relevant rules of statutory interpretation and construction, as well as in
broad federalist principles, and in interpretations reached by other relevant
entities. The rule of lenity and principles of federalism both support the idea
that NOTA section 301 should be read narrowly, as allowing (by not
prohibiting) state-benefit programs. A broader normative view of federalism
should make courts hesitant to preempt state authority in devising public
policy–driven efforts to provide benefits to organ donors, where not directly in
conflict with federal law. Preemption would intrude on the state’s fundamental
ability to decide how fiscal burdens and benefits are distributed among its
citizens—its treatment of citizens who donate organs and those who do not.
Latitude should be granted to state governments in enacting organ donor–
benefit programs. Allowing the development of state approaches to organdonation incentives creates the chance to use varying state legal regimes as
laboratories to test change, allowing reform efforts to be tested fairly quickly.
Finally, this conclusion is supported by the analysis of the scope of section
301(a) put forth by the U.S. Department of Justice in the context of paired
kidney exchange programs.
Of course, whether or not NOTA section 301 has been properly interpreted
as broadly banning donor enrichment, it undeniably has been read that way, at
least by some. Thus, our statutory arguments may be of limited use in solving
the actual problem on the ground. This unfortunate reality is made all too clear

13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
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by an examination of Pennsylvania’s funeral-voucher subsidy, whereby donors
would be enriched via a burial subsidy that would be paid by the state directly
to a funeral home. Even though NOTA’s applicability to the law was at best
dubious, the law nonetheless failed—even after passage—due to legal concerns
about NOTA. This bit of history confirms that, whatever the proper
interpretation of NOTA section 301 actually is at present, the best course
forward requires clarification of the law, either through obtaining an official
opinion from the U. S. Department of Justice definitively interpreting the law in
the context of state incentive programs or via amendment of the law.
We argue for clarification of the law through an opinion by the U.S.
Department of Justice [DOJ] Office of Legal Counsel [OLC], whose
responsibility it is to provide written opinions and advice to the various agencies
of the federal executive branch. Definitive interpretation of the federal NOTA
statutory restriction on transferring human organs for valuable consideration
would come within the OLC’s jurisdiction upon request by an appropriate
federal agency, as was done with the issue of paired kidney exchanges. A similar
request of the DOJ’s OLC should be made regarding state incentive programs.
Moreover, clarification via amendment would be beneficial in clarifying the
scope of NOTA section 301. Congress should amend NOTA to explicitly
exempt state-benefit programs. Precedent for congressional action exists in the
form of the Charlie W. Norwood Paired Donation Act of 2007 (Norwood
14
Act), which amended NOTA to clarify that it did not prohibit organ
exchanges. NOTA clarification through either a DOJ formal opinion or
legislative amendment is undoubtedly the best way forward. It might even be
the only way forward if we want to solve our organ shortage.
II
“VALUABLE CONSIDERATION” REFERS TO COMMERCIAL ENDEAVORS
In our tripartite system, the legislature is the primary lawmaking branch of
government, exercising its will within the limits of its constitutional authority
15
and through the medium of statutory law. Courts, in contrast, adjudicate
16
controversies by interpreting and applying the law. The objective in
interpreting any statute is to effectuate statutory purpose—to discover and give
meaning to what the legislature intended through the language it used in the
17
statute. Such interpretation always begins with the text of the law being

14. Pub. L. No. 110-144, 121 Stat. 1813 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273b, 274e (2006 & Supp.
IV 2011)).
15. See Separation of Power—An Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/legislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx
(last
visited Sep. 7, 2014).
16. See id.
17. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 3 (2008) [hereinafter STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS].
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reviewed.
If the language of a statute is clear, there is no need to look to other sources
19
to interpret it. If, however, there is uncertainty in the language, other rules of
20
interpretation and outside sources come into play. Section 301 of NOTA
requires such clarifying analysis. As the relevant parts of the section stipulate,
(a) Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce. The preceding sentence
does not apply with respect to human organ paired donation.
(b) Penalties. Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not
more than $50,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of subsection (a) of this section:
(1) The term “human organ” means the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof and
any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including that derived from a fetus)
specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation.
(2) The term “valuable consideration” does not include the reasonable payments
associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation,
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and
lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the donation of
the organ.
(3) The term “interstate commerce” has the meaning prescribed for it by section
321(b) of Title 21.
(4) The term ‘human organ paired donation’ means the donation and receipt of
human organs under the following circumstances:
(A) An individual (referred to in this paragraph as the ‘first donor’) desires to make a
living donation of a human organ specifically to a particular patient (referred to in this
paragraph as the ‘first patient’), but such donor is biologically incompatible as a donor
for such patient.
(B) A second individual (referred to in this paragraph as the ‘second donor’) desires
to make a living donation of a human organ specifically to a second particular patient
(referred to in this paragraph as the ‘second patient’), but such donor is biologically
incompatible as a donor for such patient.
(C) Subject to subparagraph (D), the first donor is biologically compatible as a donor
of a human organ for the second patient, and the second donor is biologically
compatible as a donor of a human organ for the first patient.
(D) If there is any additional donor-patient pair as described in subparagraph (A) or
(B), each donor in the group of donor-patient pairs is biologically compatible as a
donor of a human organ for a patient in such group.
(E) All donors and patients in the group of donor-patient pairs (whether 2 pairs or
more than 2 pairs) enter into a single agreement to donate and receive such human
organs, respectively, according to such biological compatibility in the group.
(F) Other than as described in subparagraph (E), no valuable consideration is
knowingly acquired, received, or otherwise transferred with respect to the human

18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 40.
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21

The question at hand is: does a state-provided benefit associated with, and
made subsequent to, the donation of a human organ constitute a transfer of the
22
organ for “valuable consideration” in violation of NOTA section 301(a)?
If a word or phrase is specifically defined in statute, then that definition
23
controls. Although NOTA section 301(a) proscribes the transfer of human
organs for “valuable consideration,” it does not explicitly define that term.
While section 301 includes the term “valuable consideration” in its definitions
section, it sets forth only select examples of what the term does not include:
“reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human
organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor
24
of a human organ in connection with the donation of the organ.”
NOTA’s text thus gives guidance in the negative but does not describe the
nature and character of “valuable consideration.” However, the text offers
absolutely no support for the conclusion that anything not specifically excluded
by the express language of NOTA section 301 must be deemed consideration,
and therefore prohibited.
If left undefined by the statute in which it appears, a word or phrase that has
a specific technical meaning elsewhere in the law will be deemed to bring with it
25
that accepted and well-established meaning. The U.S. Supreme Court has said,
[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition
and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of
ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it
was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise
instructed. In such a case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction
26
with widely accepted definitions, not as departure from them.

This principle sheds considerable light on the meaning of NOTA section
301(a). “Consideration” is a word whose meaning is firmly rooted in contract
law: It refers to a bargained-for exchange between parties that serves as the

21. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). Sean Arthurs cites recent Supreme Court rulings
that might put intrastate markets beyond the scope of federal legislation. See Sean Arthurs, No More
Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of
our National Organ Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. R. 1101 (2005).
22. See generally Rick K. Jones, The Gift of Life and “Diseases of Language”: Recovering a Lost
Distinction in Effectuating the Purpose of the National Organ Transplant Act’s Prohibition on the
Transfer of Human Organs for Valuable Consideration, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1067 (2007) (explaining what
constitutes valuable consideration under NOTA).
23. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra note 17,
at 5.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
25. See STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra note
17, at 6 n.23. (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991) (“Where a
common law principle is well established . . . the courts may take it as a given that Congress has
legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except ‘when a statutory purpose to the
contrary is evident.’”)).
26. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
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27

basis for an enforceable contract. It is a term of commerce and signifies an
28
exchange that is mutually induced. Consideration is not a component of
gratuitous transfers, in which one party gives something of value independent of
29
receiving anything in return. Given this well-established meaning, it is
reasonable to conclude that the idea of “valuable consideration” in NOTA was
meant to apply to bargained-for, contract-type commercial arrangements and
not to state-benefit programs, which are designed to provide a gratuity or
advance other noncommercial, public-policy objectives. This conclusion about
the meaning of valuable consideration is further supported by the legislative
history of NOTA, its background purposes, application of canons of statutory
interpretation and construction, principles of federalism, and de facto
enforcement of NOTA section 301. These supporting factors are examined in
turn in the subparts that follow.
A. The Legislative History of NOTA Section 301(a) Is Buying and Selling
Focused
The specific legislative history behind the insertion of section 301’s
30
prohibition can be used to shed light on congressional intent. The legislative
history of NOTA section 301 supports the notion that it was meant to apply
only to bargained-for, contract-type commercial arrangements. The prohibition
was a straightforward legislative response to a plan by an infamous physician—
H. Barry Jacobs—to buy organs from individuals flown in from Third World
countries and sell them to patients in need. Dr. Jacobs charged the patients, or
31
Medicare, a $2,000 to $5,000 fee for his service. The legislative history, though
replete with denunciations of commercial transactions of this kind, is largely
32
silent on other kinds of compensatory transactions.
The first evidence that NOTA was a response to Dr. Jacobs’s plan lies in the
legislation’s early drafts. Those drafts were largely silent on payment for organs
and instead concentrated on the creation of a nationwide procurement and
distribution system for organs. And, at one of the early NOTA hearings in the
House, Al Gore, then the Tennessee congressman spearheading the legislation,
spoke approvingly of “the provision of incentives, such as a [presumably thirdparty] voucher system or a tax credit to a donor’s estate” if “efforts to improve
33
voluntary donation are unsuccessful.”

27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1979).
28. See id. § 71(2) (explaining requirement of mutual promises).
29. Id. § 71 cmt. b.
30. See STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra note
17, at 39–44.
31. A Bill to Amend the Public Health Service Act to Authorize Financial Assistance for Organ
Procurement Organizations and For Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on
Health & Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 10 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on
H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & Env’t].
32. Id.
33. Id. at 10.
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But then, in the fall of 1983, came a Washington Post story about H. Barry
Jacobs, whose medical license had been revoked five years earlier on a
conviction for Medicare fraud. The story discussed Jacobs’ plans to establish an
organ brokerage called the International Kidney Exchange (IKE). Jacobs
would recruit healthy individuals from poor countries and fly them to the
United States where he would pay them for one of their kidneys. The individual
needing a transplant would pay for the cost of the kidney plus $2000 to $5000
for Jacobs’ service to “escape the tyranny of dialysis,” as the New York Times
34
put it.
In November 1983, Representative Al Gore’s Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and
Technology invited Jacobs to testify at a hearing entitled Procurement and
Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation. His testimony was not wellreceived. Jacobs’ pugnacious manner and his frank acknowledgement of the
money-making potential of IKE could not have helped his cause. Jacobs’
“business plan” became the lightning rod for a general outcry against the idea
35
of paying for organs. Section 301, a provision prohibiting payment for organs,
36
was soon inserted into the draft bill.
Over the course of numerous NOTA hearings and congressional reports, a
set of concerns driving the prohibition emerged, all of them relating to
commercial payments by the recipient to the donor that might or might not be
mediated by a broker—but none of them by their terms extending to
noncommercial (though perhaps still enrichment-bearing) transactions. The
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources stated in its report that the
proposed legislation “[p]rohibits the interstate buying and selling of human
37
organs for transplantation,” and that “the prohibition on the buying and
selling of human organs is directed at preventing the for-profit marketing of
38
kidneys and other organs,” and, finally, that “[i]t is the sense of the Committee
that individuals or organizations should not profit by the sale of human organs
39
for transplantation.” The House conference report reiterated that section 301
was directed toward monetary exchanges: “This title intends to make the
40
buying and selling of human organs unlawful . . . .” The key terms, “buying,”
“selling,” “marketing,” and “profit,” are all terms relating to commercial
business transactions.
34. Nicholas Wade, The Editorial Notebook; The Crisis in Human Spare Parts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
1983, at A26; see also Susan Hankin Denise, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015
(1985).
35. Keith Mueller, The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984: Congressional Response to
Changing Biotechnology, 8 POL’Y STUD. REV. 346, 350 (1989); Victor Cohn, New Federal Help for
Transplants Pressed by Gore, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1983, at A17 (describing how Gore was moved to
ban commerce of organs as a “response” to Barry Jacobs’ Virginia plan for IKE).
36. Cohn, supra note 35.
37. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 2, 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976, 3978 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 16–17, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3982 (emphasis added).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1127, at 16 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992.
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Members and witnesses also expressed concern that a payment regime
would exacerbate economic inequalities because only wealthy patients would be
able to afford organs and, to make matters worse, they (and perhaps greedy
brokers as well) would be benefitting at the expense of the poor, who would
41
serve as donors. These concerns, again, most clearly applied to commercial
transactions for organs. Representative Henry Waxman of the House Ways and
Means Committee invoked the image of a degrading, heartless marketplace,
42
saying, “Human organs should not be treated like fenders in a junkyard.” The
late Senator Paul Tsongas introduced a Senate resolution entitled A Resolution
43
to Condemn the Sale for Profit of Human Organs for Transplantation. His
accompanying statement pressed the need for NOTA section 301 as a corrective
to monetary exchange that was already taking place sporadically:
Representative Tsongas worried that “the . . . pressures caused by a lack of
national policy have encouraged the practices of the sale of human organs for
44
profit.” Some commentators said that introducing payment into the organ
procurement apparatus could undermine the newly formed altruistic system
45
before its full potential was realized.
The legislative history therefore demonstrates that the insertion of section
301(a), the ban against the transfer of human organs for valuable consideration,
was a direct response to a specific plan for the buying and selling of organs. The
purpose was to repudiate the kind of commercial transaction reflected in the
Jacobs scenario. It was not to broadly prohibit all transactional organ
exchanges.
B. The Policy Rationale of a NOTA Section 301 Can Be Satisfied Without
Banning Noncommercial State-Benefit Programs
When passed, NOTA section 301 was intended to assuage critics who
worried that an organ market would (1) necessarily involve class disparity in the
distribution of transplants, (2) stifle a system of altruism before it could take
root, (3) encourage commodification of donors and profiteering by
unscrupulous middlemen, (4) promote crowding out of nonmonetary reasons to

41. Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH. POST,
Sept. 19, 1983, at A9; see Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearing
on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 98th
Cong. 377 (1983) [hereinafter Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation]
(statement by physician about inadequate follow-up healthcare); see also National Organ Transplant
Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 98th Cong. 257 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health &
the Env’t] (stating that only the wealthy would be able to afford transplants); id. at 282 (worrying that
the wealthy will benefit at the expense of the poor).
42. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 26 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the
Subcomm. on Health].
43. S. RES. 251, 98th Cong. (1983).
44. Id.
45. Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcom. on Health & Env’t, supra note 31, at 234, 277.
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donate, (5) encourage donors to lie about their medical histories, and (6) cause
the costs of transplantation to become unnecessarily high. All of these concerns
can be fully addressed without interpreting NOTA section 301 to prohibit state
incentive programs.
First, critics of Jacobs’ plan cited the risk of inflaming economic-class
46
disparity. In a traditional free market, the wealthy can obtain items and the
poor cannot. But in virtually all state proposals for donor compensation, it is
not the sick person who reaches into his own pocket to reward the donor. A
governmental entity provides the reward. Thus, no matter how generous or
modest a patient’s income, anyone in need of a kidney would benefit. And, in
keeping with the current system for distribution of organs from the newly
deceased, the newly offered kidney would go to the next patient in line. As for
the financial status of donors, as opposed to recipients, some express worry that
the promise of a reward will exploit poor donors who saw it as an offer they
couldn’t refuse. The obvious remedy is to establish a months-long screening
process, to allay impulsivity, and to reward donors in the form of a noncash
reward which will not appeal to those in desperate need of immediate financial
help. An additional option is to limit participation to would-be donors whose
incomes are high enough so that they pay taxes (and hence are eligible for a
nonrefundable tax credit) or to those who make a certain threshold income.
The drawback to such an approach, however, is that it would prevent some very
low-income individuals from participating in a program that they might deem
beneficial. But in any event, distributive concerns can be addressed within the
framework of state-benefit programs—such concerns do not require banning
state programs altogether.
A second objection to enriching donors that was expressed at the time was
that a national system of organ procurement and allocation was not yet up and
running. But what would happen if the “altruistic” system were inadequate?
Notably, Al Gore offered a back-up plan. He spoke of using “a voucher system
or a tax credit to a donor’s estate” if “efforts to improve voluntary donation are
47
unsuccessful.” Almost three decades after the passage of NOTA, it is clear that
voluntary donation has not succeeded in meeting the needs of thousands of
patients. Thus, whatever concern might be voiced over the integrity of the
altruistic system has been mooted by the inefficacy of that system.
Third, what of respect for donors? Of treating their organs as “like fenders
in a junk yard,” as Representative Waxman feared? Herding poor people on a
plane to travel to a foreign land to undergo a surgical procedure they might not
even understand and shipping them back home without follow-up care is not a
winning plan.
But again, that scenario is nothing like the one that has been proposed.
46. Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, September 24, 1983 at 9;
Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcom. on Health & Env’t, supra note 31, at 329.
47. Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcom. on Health & Env’t, supra note 31, at 10.
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Dignity is affirmed when we respect the capacity of individuals to make
decisions in their own best interest, protect their health, and express gratitude
for their sacrifice. Enrichment is not per se inconsistent with this. It is hard to
imagine what kind of sacred principle is threatened by rewarding a donor who is
willing, protected, and informed, and whose actions avert needless suffering or
save a life.
A fourth concern was that providing financial incentives would decrease the
48
willingness of people to voluntarily donate their organs. Such a conclusion was
49
premised on the writing of British social scientist Richard Titmuss. However, a
careful reading of Titmuss does not support this point, and subsequent
experiments with incentives for blood donation indicate that any crowding out
is not universal and that, among groups where it might be an issue, the problem
50
can be averted by turning the reward into a contribution to a charity. So the
concern that altruism might run dry is, again, no bar to state-benefit programs.
Fifth, some witnesses to Jacobs’ proposed plan worried that financial
incentives would create a powerful inducement for potential donors to provide
51
inaccurate medical histories. That concern is largely moot given the modernday ability to test for HIV, hepatitis C, and other transmissible diseases. Nor is
the time pressure in living-organ donation as pressing as for deceased, where
there is not sufficient time to interview the donor’s family, obtain old medical
records, and so on. State-benefit programs can operate without implicating
whatever remnant of this concern still exists.
Another fear was that donors with valuable matches would extort large
52
sums of money from vulnerable patients. Again, there is no opportunity for
this to occur because a government, not patients themselves, offers the benefits.
Any benefits would be fixed and the kidney would go to the next in line, so a
donor could not extort money from any particular individual who needed the
kidney of a particular biological type. This fear, too, then, does not necessitate a
ban of state-benefit programs.
Finally, there was the caveat that financial incentives would add cost to the
53
overall transplantation budget. This is certainly wrong in the case of kidney
transplants (and likely erroneous with respect to other organs as well). Multiple
economic analyses of kidney transplantation demonstrate impressive savings
48. See Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health, supra note 42, at 112, 115, 174–75;
Procurement and Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation, supra note 31, at 230, 239–40, 243,
248–49, 269–71, 340–41, 354–56, 369–71.
49. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
(1970).
50. See Lorenz Goette, Alois Stutzer & Beat M. Frey, Prosocial Motivation and Blood Donations:
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 37 TRANSFUSION MED. & HEMOTHERAPHY 149 (2010), available
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2914427/pdf/tmh0037-0149.pdf.
51. See Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 860 n.30 (9th Cir. 2012).
52. Id.
53. Edward W. Nelson et al., Financial Incentives for Organ Donations: A Rep. to the Payment
Subcomm. OPTN/UNOS Ethics Comm. (June 30, 1993), http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/
bioethics.asp?index=4 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
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based on the removal of patients from chronic dialysis, a treatment that is
54
typically paid for by Medicare and Medicaid, not private insurance. In fact,
once a patient is off dialysis, the money saved by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) could be used to underwrite the cost of the reward.
This concern, like all of the others, by no means requires a ban of state
programs—in fact, this one counsels in favor of state programs.
In sum, all potential risks enumerated above as the rationale for banning
incentives can be mitigated by reform models that stipulate a governmentregulated, in-kind system of exchange. State-benefit programs can operate
without offending the concerns above.
In its opinion regarding medical marijuana, the DOJ considered whether
state law stood “‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
55
purposes and objectives of Congress.’” We can ask the same thing of a stateinitiated effort to pass incentive legislation. Put another way, did Congress truly
intend for a widow to be fined $50,000 or imprisoned for five years because she
accepted a funeral benefit in return for permitting doctors to transplant the
organs of her deceased husband? Did lawmakers believe that felony charges
should be brought against a state-based charity that enables a graduate student
fund his retirement account subsequent to donating the kidney that saves the
life of a young father who was failing on dialysis? In light of its emphases on
buying, selling, power imbalances between the wealthy and the poor, and
profiting by intermediaries, it is hard to imagine that Congress had the widow,
or even the graduate student, in its sights.
C. Additional Rules of Statutory Interpretation and Construction
Beyond the language, legislative intent, and background purposes of the
ban, two other canons of statutory construction affirm the conclusion that
NOTA section 301(a) ought to be read narrowly and, as such, apply only to
clearly commercial exchanges, not to state incentive programs. First, the rule of
lenity requires statutes with penal provisions (like NOTA section 301) be
interpreted narrowly so that criminal sanctions are only imposed in the most
unambiguous of circumstances. Second, the presumption against preemption
holds that when a federal statute can be read not to preempt state laws, a
respect for federalist principles necessitates reading the federal rule narrowly.
1. Criminal Penalties and the Rule of Lenity
In accurately interpreting the scope of NOTA’s prohibition, it is significant
to note that the prohibition is enforced by a high—and criminal—penalty for

54. See Arthur J. Matas & Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (vendor) kidneys: A Costeffectiveness Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216-21 (2004).
55. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 8
(2012), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R42398_20120306.pdf (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).
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violation: namely, a possible $50,000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both.
The rule of lenity holds that a court interpreting a penal provision in the law
should resolve any statutory uncertainty in favor of the defendant by adopting a
57
narrower—meaning more lenient—reading of the scope of the crime. This idea
flows from the concern that expansive judicial interpretations of penal
provisions would create criminal penalties not originally intended by the
58
legislature. Following the rule of lenity ensures “fair warning [to citizens] by so
resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply to conduct clearly
59
covered.” Because criminal punishment is to be avoided where not clearly
imposed, more lenient interpretations are to be favored over other, similarly
60
plausible but harsher, interpretations. Because NOTA’s prohibition against the
transfer of human organs for valuable consideration is enforced by criminal
penalties, it should be interpreted narrowly by limiting the scope of prohibited
activity to clearly and definitively commercial endeavors.
2. Presumption Against Preemption
Under our federalist system, valid federal law supersedes inconsistent state
61
62
law. There is, however, a presumption against preemption. The U.S. Supreme
Court has said, “[H]istoric police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by [a federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
63
Congress.” Whenever there are multiple plausible interpretations of a statute,
courts are to choose the interpretation that grants the most leeway to the states,
particularly when the law concerns core state-level functions, including public
64
health and the design of the state’s tax and expenditure system.
The reluctance to preempt state authority is at its apogee when a federal law
would disrupt implementation of the state government’s own programs (as
opposed to merely displacing the state’s authority to regulate private conduct).
Therefore, even if “valuable consideration” is generally interpreted to apply to
private payments, it should not so easily apply to state-government benefits
provided to organ donors.
There is a precedent for this in the antitrust exemption. The Sherman Act
states, “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
56. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
57. See generally NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 59.3, at 126–31.
58. Id. at 133.
59. United States v. Pritchard, 346 F.3d 469, 474 (2003) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 266 (1997).
60. Id.
61. See STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS, supra
note 17, at 18–19.
62. Id.
63. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (presumption against preemption for
police powers), quoted in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT
TRENDS, supra note 17, at 18.
64. Id.
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conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
65
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” State legislative programs to restrain
competition could easily be interpreted to fall within this prohibition. Yet the
Supreme Court held in Parker v. Brown in 1943 that the Sherman Act does not
66
bar such programs. The Court paid no heed to the absence of a specific
exemption for state programs. Instead, it emphasized the absence of a specific
inclusion of state programs and also relied on the premise that a state program
is not a “contract,” “combination,” or “conspiracy.” The Court said:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and
agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress. The Sherman Act makes no mention
of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or
official action directed by a state . . . There is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain
state action in the Act’s legislative history . . . The state in adopting and enforcing the
[challenged] program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy
in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint
67
as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.

The Court subsequently held that anticompetitive conduct by private parties
is immune from the Sherman Act if the parties are implementing a policy
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” and “actively supervised” by
68
the state government.
Because NOTA section 301 does not mention the proscription of benefits to
organ donors made or authorized by state governments, extending by
interpretation the application of NOTA’s restriction to such state benefits
would too lightly attribute to Congress “an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state’s control over its officers and agents,” exactly what the Court refused to do
69
in Parker.
Indeed, the intrusion on state sovereignty would be even greater in the
NOTA context than in the Sherman Act context, at least for organ-donation
benefits provided directly by the state. In that case, the issue at stake would not
be the state’s power to regulate private businesses, which constantly operates
under the possibility of federal preemption, but the state’s fundamental power
to structure its own tax and spending programs—its ability to decide how fiscal
70
burdens and benefits should be distributed among its citizens. Also,
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
66. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 350–52 (1943).
67. Id.
68. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); see
also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 99–100 (1988) (supporting the clearly articulated and actively
supervised standard); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 56–57
(1985) (supporting the same standard).
69. Parker, 351 U.S. at 351.
70. The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the vital importance of states’ taxing power.
See, e.g., Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583, 585 (1953) (describing “the power of a state to tax” as “basic to
its sovereignty”); Tulley et al. v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73 (1976) (recognizing “the imperative need
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interpreting the term “valuable consideration” to include state tax incentives or
grants is at least as problematic as interpreting “contract,” “conspiracy,” or
“combination” to include state programs to restrain competition.
The case for a NOTA exception for state benefits or tax incentives for organ
donors is therefore at least as strong as the case for the Parker exception to the
Sherman Act. The state is not buying organs. Rather, “as sovereign” and
through “an act of government,” the state is bestowing its bounty on citizens
who have engaged in behavior of which the state approves. Parker teaches,
therefore, that NOTA’s ban should be interpreted so as to grant the most
leeway to the states and should not apply to benefit programs for organ
donation made by or through the state. Moreover, such an interpretation is
supported by the principles motivating a federalist system (which is discussed in
the next section).
Finally, the DOJ’s OLC contemplated the scope of section 301 of NOTA in
71
a 2007 memorandum. Within this memorandum, the meaning of “commercial”
is inconsistent with banning in-kind compensation. The DOJ notes that “[t]he
legislative history [of NOTA section 301] does not suggest that any Member of
Congress understood the bill as addressing non-monetary or otherwise non72
commercial transfers.” Even when transfers, such as swaps (exchanges of
kidneys between donors and recipients of two unmatched pairs), go beyond
gratuitous offers and enter into quid pro quo territory, the spirit of section 301
has been deemed by the DOJ to remain intact. Like kidney swaps,
contemporary incentive plans do not entail cash or purchasing in the traditional
sense. There is no overt or implied contract between the patient and the donor:
Participants can withdraw without penalty.
73
Nor is there a role for a broker, like Jacobs, to reap profits. Furthermore,
of a State to administer its own fiscal operations”). Accordingly, the Court has required that Congress
speak clearly when it wishes to restrict states’ taxing authority. See, e.g., Department of Revenue of
Oregon v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 345 (stating that “principles of federalism” make the
Court reluctant to extend “beyond its evident scope” a federal statute that “sets limits upon the
taxation authority of state government, an authority we have recognized as central to state
sovereignty”). Because no restrictions on state tax incentives fall with the “evident scope” of NOTA,
ACF counsels that the statute not be interpreted as imposing any such restriction.
71. See infra, part II.E.
72. Memorandum from C. Kevin Marshall, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to Daniel Meron,
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Legality of Alternative Organ Donation Practices Under
42 U.S.C. § 274e, at 4 n.2 (Mar. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Marshall Memorandum], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/organtransplant.pdf.
73. On a related note, in the context of medical marijuana, a DOJ memorandum clarified the
distinction between sick individuals who required marijuana for health reasons and “commercial,” forprofit dispensaries (which are analogous to brokers like Jacobs). Memorandum from James M. Cole,
Deputy Attorney G. to U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking
to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/
dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf. Prosecutorial discretion extended to the patients
who purchased medical marijuana; it was the distributers who were targeted for prosecution. Id. In the
case of incentivized organ donation, absolutely everyone who requires an organ is very sick, if not
terminally ill, and no individual profits from organizing the transfer of an organ to the patient.
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the donor reward can be framed as compensation for time and inconvenience,
not for the organ per se. This is in keeping with the practice surrounding
surrogacy: It is not the baby itself that carries monetary value, but the birth
mother’s sacrifice of time and inconvenience. Moreover, compensation to organ
donors could take the form of noncash, in-kind benefits.
D. The Case for Federalism in Organ Transplantation
Federalist principles do more than simply support a canon of statutory
construction; they also undergird a basic normative preference in our dualist
system. Going beyond the canons of construction, federalism-based arguments
can be employed to explain why, as a more basic policy matter, NOTA section
301 should be read as banning only commercial exchanges of organs, rather
than government-regulated in-kind systems of exchange.
The general merits of federalism have of course been argued at length in the
74
related scholarship and jurisprudence, and there is no need to go any further in
defending federalist principles for the purposes of this article. Even without
doing so, the benefits of a federalist approach are clear in the organ transplant–
policy case for two reasons: First, because organ transplantation presents
unique features that make the normative experimentation, core-competency,
local-control, and state-diversity arguments for federalism more powerful.
Second, because federalism has been the dominant approach in the field of
organ-transplant policy for some time now. The current state of affairs proves
that, accepting even just the federalist basics, NOTA section 301 should be read
as banning only commercial exchanges of organs.
A signal advantage of federalism is its ability to use varying state legal
75
regimes as laboratories to test change. Enacting reforms on the state level
creates natural experiments, with reformist states testing an intervention and
complacent states taking the position of the control groups. This dynamic
gauges both the positive and negative elements of reform. In the transplant
case, where positive results (numbers of donors and transplants) are necessarily
easy to count, reform efforts can be tested fairly quickly.
Experimentation also links up well to the commodification concerns raised
by compensation-based reforms. The commodification label applies to a set of

74. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court 1997 Term—
Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60–69 (1998) (advocating using
federalism as a model for decentralized decisionmaking for judges to use to allow provisional, workable
solutions to disputes); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 19–22 (2007) (arguing that constructive political
debate is created by strong states’ rights as it leads to effective and organized interest groups);Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493–94 (1987);
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005)
(“[D]ual sovereignty” defines federalism as “a system of independent national and state governments
that must be protected from each other.”).
75. See Hills, supra note 74.
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76

arguments that are rather diverse, but some potential consequences are
77
testable hypothesis. For example, compensating a kidney donor could cause a
donor (and society in general) to devalue the integrity of her body, or bodies in
general; it might lead the donor to envision herself as merely a source of
monetary value rather than as a valued human being. Will donors who receive
some form of compensation experience themselves as devalued? Will states that
allow some forms of compensation for transplants find themselves sliding down
a slippery slope towards legalizing other potentially corrupting legal practices?
Though unlikely, these kinds of corruptions might possibly follow from
compensation-based reforms, and society needs to know if any of them do.
Even then, states will still have to weigh the frequency with which they occur
against happier outcomes and ways to protect against them in the future. On the
other hand, many advocates for donor compensation believe the potential for
corruption to be illusory; the only thing capable of informing this debate would
78
be future experimentation with different policies.
There is also a question of the relative competence of federal and state
actors in deciding transplant policy. Effective interest-group organizing may be
more active at the local level. Different states with different demographic
79
profiles may find the prospect of effectuating change more or less difficult.
Additionally, the regional organization of deceased-donation policy means that
different states will vary in terms of the demand for change. States that are
lagging in transplant outcomes may have a stronger demand for reform. Local
interest groups in those states might become more active than those in more
successful states. Alternately, policy innovators in relatively successful states
might have more influence and expertise, allowing them to be more effective in
enacting policy. On a federal level, moreover, interest-group politics may be
less effective. Given the lack of progress in recent years, it may be the case that
current stakeholders have grown complacent and are incentivized to simply
perpetuate their own fiefdoms. If reform is itself desirable, the states may be the
only game in town. Piloting reform at the state level can help foster a national
discussion.
76. Julie Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 121–24 (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
77. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN
SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER THINGS (1996); M. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY 9
(2012); Elizabeth Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990).
78. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies,
and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007).
79. Hypertension and diabetes (as well as other causes of kidney disease) are more prevalent
among poorer populations. Minorities are typically overrepresented on the waiting list for organs,
partly because of increased risk factors and partly because the increased difficulty of biological
matching from a smaller population. See Jasjit S. Ahluwalia et al., Correlates of Controlled
Hypertension in Indigent, Inner-City Hypertensive Patients, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 77, 77 (2002);
see also U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, Research on Social and Behavioral Interventions to
Increase
Organ
Donation
Grant
Program
1999-2004,
http://organdonor.gov/dtcp/minoritycampaign.html (last visited June 15, 2014).
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Finally, health policy has traditionally been conducted at the local level.
Transplant policy in particular has largely been organized regionally. State
governments maintain waiting lists, legal rules concerning deceased donation
and consent are contained in state statute, and transplants are facilitated by
regional entities called organ-procurement organizations (OPOs). Indeed,
looking to the history of transplant policy demonstrates how it has traditionally
been a state-level concern, making conservative interpretations of federal rules
particularly appropriate.
Ultimately, then, there are powerful normative reasons for bringing a
federalism-based approach to the forefront of transplant policy. These
arguments alone would counsel a narrow construction of NOTA section 301 as
banning only commercial exchanges, but, helpfully, further arguments, based on
states’ historical control over organ-transplantation policy, are available.
Organ-transplantation policy has not always been a matter of federal
oversight. Prior to the enactment of NOTA, the federal government essentially
left this issue to the states. Indeed, the first policy effort to address organ
scarcity in the United States was initiated at the state level with the enactment
80
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) in 1968.
The UAGA was a model law developed by the National Conference of
Commissioners for Uniform State Laws and adopted in nearly identical form by
81
all fifty states and the District of Columbia by the early 1970s. The Conference
convened a group of highly esteemed individuals, recruited and appointed by
various state governors, to draft an organ-transplant policy. E. Blythe Stason,
professor of law and former dean and provost of the University of Michigan,
82
chaired the commission.
The UAGA focused primarily on who possessed the jurisdiction over
organs of the deceased for the purposes of donation, and under what
83
circumstances organ donation could be made. But that is not all the act did.
The commissioners, led by Stason, also made strides toward considering
incentives as a means of organ procurement: They left the question open for
84
individual state legislatures to resolve through the democratic process.
Although commentators differ on whether the omission from the UAGA of
direct language on this point was intentional or an oversight, there are
indications that leaving the question of incentives for states to decide was

80. N.J. LAW REVISION COMM., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE UNIFORM
ANATOMICAL GIFTS ACT (1987) at 2, available at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us/rpts/anagft.pdf
[hereinafter Report and Recommendation].
81. Id.
82. Memorial Resolution by the University of Michigan Law Faculty Concerning E. Blythe Stason,
71 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1973) [hereinafter Memorial Resolution]. Stason also served as the Frank C.
Rand Distinguished Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University during the drafting of the UAGA.
83. Uniform
Anatomical
Gifts
Act,
§
23-06.6-01
(1978),
available
at
http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t23c06-6.pdf?20140420153611.
84. E. Blythe Stason, Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 BUS. LAW. 919–27 (1968); Michele
Goodwin The Body Market: Race Politics & Private Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599 (2007).
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reasoned and deliberate. As a dean, provost, and commissioner, Stason was
known for being meticulous, methodical, and purposeful in the examination of
85
ideas and the implementation of policies. With Stason at the helm of the
commission, if the framers intended to ban the sale of organs, they would have
86
done so.
In any case, Stason made his views clear. He said that the UAGA drafters
contemplated incentives and supported allowing states the flexibility to decide
those matters. In interviews and writings after the enactment of the UAGA, the
commission chair remarked that the question of payments was intentionally left
87
open for states to decide. Demonstrating a nuanced view of what organ
transplantation in the United States could become, Stason acknowledged that
the possibility of donors demanding payments might arise, but he did not hold
88
that all payments would be unethical, immoral, or illegal. According to Stason,
the commissioners felt that “the matter [of payments] should be left to the
89
decency of intelligent human beings.” In taking this position, Stason adhered
to Justice Louis Brandeis’s famous admonition that federalism allows for the
possibility that “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
90
rest of the country . . . .”
After presenting the UAGA model law to their home states for ratification
and enactment, legislators sought to work within the spirit of the original draft.
In a radical shift, states that had previously enacted laws to ban payments for
organs and body parts—among them Massachusetts, Delaware, Hawaii,
91
Maryland, and New York—repealed them. For the next sixteen years, the 1968
UAGA, as adopted by the states, was the only law governing organ
92
transplantation in America. When Congress adopted NOTA, it therefore did
so against the backdrop of a legal regime in which organ donation incentives
had been left to states’ autonomous decisions.
E. The DOJ and UNOS Have Already Narrowly Construed Section 301
As reviewed above, the text, the legislative history, and the statutory

85. Memorial Resolution, supra note 82.
86. Stason, supra note 84, at 928 (assuming that payment would be rare and that crafting a
prohibition would “not be easy” and concluding that until payment “becomes a problem of some
dimensions,” the matter should not be addressed through legislative prohibition).
87. See, e.g., id. at 921–24.
88. Id. at 927.
89. Id.
90. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
91. See Act of June 12, 1967, ch. 353, § 7, 1967 Mass. Acts 202, 202 (repealed 1971) (prohibiting the
sale of organs, body parts, and tissues after death); see also Law of August 1, 1968, ch. 429, § 1780, 56
Del. Laws 1773, 1773 (1967) (repealed 1970); Act of May 20, 1967, ch. 94, § 1, 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws 91,
91 (repealed 1969) (prohibiting the sale of bodies after death); Law of April 24, 1961, ch. 315, § 1, 1961
Md. Laws 397, 398 (repealed 1968); Law of April 22, 1964, ch. 702, § 1, 1964 N.Y. Laws 1827, 1828
(repealed 1971).
92. Report and Recommendation, supra note 80.
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purposes of NOTA section 301(a) lead to the conclusion that state benefits
should lie outside the scope of section 301’s ban. The DOJ’s OLC reviewed the
scope of section 301 using similar analysis in a 2007 memorandum and
interpreted it to have a narrow application to transactions clearly and definitely
93
commercial. Inasmuch as NOTA’s criminal penalties would be prosecuted by
the DOJ, their analysis of section 301(a) is persuasive evidence of the best
94
reading of NOTA section 301.
The DOJ memorandum concerned paired exchanges, which help patients
who already have a willing donor but cannot receive the kidney because of
biological incompatibility. If this mismatched couple can trade with another
mismatched couple, the transplants can take place, with the donor from couple
A giving his kidney to the compatible recipient of couple B, and vice versa. The
virtue is that two lives are saved instead of none. Without the exchange, both
patients would languish on dialysis.
In determining that paired exchanges did not violate section 301, the DOJ
acknowledged the murkiness surrounding the statutory language “valuable
consideration.” Noting that valuable consideration is defined in the statute by
what it is not (reimbursement for expenses related to donation), the DOJ
memorandum said “the vague phrase ‘valuable consideration’ addresses organ
transfers that could be considered to involve a ‘purchase’ rather than all
95
donations that may involve some exchange.” According to the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), which was also called upon to review NOTA in this
context, “[t]he legislative history of the 1984 NOTA does not discuss the
meaning of the term ‘valuable consideration’. It simply expresses Congress’s
96
intent to criminalize the buying and selling of organs for profit.” The DOJ
went even further than the CRS and stated that because section 301 is a
97
criminal statute, it must be interpreted narrowly under the rule of lenity. As
such, “valuable consideration” is best understood “as referring to the buying
and selling of organs for monetary gain or to organ exchanges that are
98
otherwise commercial.”
93. Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72.
94. The DOJ prosecutes federal law offenders and represents the U.S. government in court; its
attorneys represent the rights and interests of the American people and enforce federal criminal and
civil laws. See About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html (last visited Mar.
10, 2014).
95. Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72, at 2–3.
96. ERIN D. WILLIAMS, BERNICE REYES-AKINBILEJE & KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL33902, LIVING ORGAN DONATION AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 9 (2007),
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33902_20070308.pdf.
97. Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72, at 6.
98. Id. at 5, 6–7 (emphasis added). One commentator on the DOJ’s legal analysis has stated,
DOJ’s analysis focused heavily on the involvement of monetary value in the transfer of human organs
and how the presence or absence of monetary value impacts the conclusion that a transaction contains
“valuable consideration.” This focus apparently enabled the DOJ to address the issue at hand as to
whether something not of monetary value—the kidney exchange programs—could be “valuable
consideration.” At this point, the devil is in the detail. The DOJ concluded that for consideration to be
valuable it must involve something of “pecuniary, readily convertible into monetary value.” It did not,
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Ultimately, the DOJ determined that “the legislative history does not
suggest that any Member of Congress understood the bill as addressing non99
monetary or otherwise non-commercial transfers.” Therefore, a transfer of an
100
organ through paired exchange does not involve “valuable consideration.”
Similarly, General Counsel to UNOS also undertook a legal analysis of
101
paired donations in the context of section 301. According to the network’s
2006 position paper, “NOTA § 301 is legally and historically inapplicable to
102
today’s living donation arrangements.”
Paired exchange preserves the
essential elements of a gift which are, firstly, “donative intent,” meaning an
intention to give without accrual of material personal benefit—the living donor
gives up something, for example a kidney, and knowingly assumes additional
health risk, secondly, actual presentation of the kidney, and, finally, its
103
acceptance without payment. Noting that Congress’s intent in enacting NOTA
was to criminalize the purchase and sale of organs for profit, as in commercial
business transactions, by defining valuable consideration “as monetary transfer
or a transfer of valuable property between donor, recipient, and/or organ
104
broker in a sale transaction,” counsel to UNOS also concluded that paired
kidney donations involved conditional gifts and were, therefore, not restricted
by section 301.
105
Congress ultimately adopted the Norwood Act on December 21, 2007,
which amended NOTA to expressly exempt paired donations from “valuable
106
consideration.” Accordingly, the specific question examined by the DOJ and
however, conclude the converse: that all things of “pecuniary, readily convertible into monetary value”
are “valuable consideration.” The DOJ ultimately said that “valuable consideration” in section 301(a)
of NOTA refers to the “buying and selling of organs for monetary gain or to organ exchanges that are
otherwise commercial.” The fundamental distinction drawn, therefore, was not between the monetary
or nonmonetary value of the thing transacted but between the commercial as opposed to
noncommercial nature of the transactions.
Jones, supra note 22, at 1086–87.
99. Marshall Memorandum, supra note 72, at 3 n.2.
100. Rick Jones, in The Gift of Life and “Diseases of Language,” further commented that,
“inasmuch as the kidney exchange programs reviewed by the Department of Justice did not have any
clear pecuniary transfer, they were deemed not to involve valuable consideration because without
obvious monetary value in the exchange there was no valuableness in the transfer. Without valuableness
there could be no valuable consideration.” Supra note 22, at 1088 (emphasis in original).
101. WILLIAMS MULLEN, INTENDED RECIPIENT EXCHANGES, PAIRED EXCHANGES AND NOTA
§ 301, at 1 (2003).
102. Id. at 2.
103. Numerous court cases have found that gifts cannot contain consideration. See Deli v.
Hasselmo, 542 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (“[C]onsideration is what distinguishes a
contract from a gift.”); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 4 N.E.2d 919, 919 (Ohio 1936) (noting that there is
no consideration in a gratuitous transfer); Rusk v. Rusk, 5 S.W.3d 299, 303–05 (Tex. App. 1999)
(holding that absence of consideration is key to finding a legal gift); Pankhurst v. Weitinger & Tucker,
850 S.W.2d 726, 730–31 (Tex. App. 1993) (stating that lack of consideration is an essential characteristic
of a gift).
104. MULLEN, supra note 101, at 2.
105. Pub. L. No. 110-144, 121 Stat. 1813 (2007) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273b, 274e (2006 & Supp.
IV 2011)).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
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UNOS, whether paired donations violated the pre-Norwood version of section
301, is moot. Nonetheless, the DOJ and UNOS analyses are highly instructive,
because they both strongly support a narrow interpretation of “valuable
consideration” as involving purely commercial endeavors. Thus, the DOJ
analysis confirms what seems perfectly clear from the other sources considered:
NOTA should be read narrowly, to ban only commercial exchanges of organs—
not state-benefit programs.
III
THE PENNSYLVANIA EXPERIENCE
Notwithstanding the strong statutory basis for concluding that NOTA does
not ban state-benefit programs, the law has nonetheless in fact impeded states
from adopting such programs. To that end, we now consider the struggle that
accompanied Pennsylvania’s funeral-benefit law, the only state law to test the
scope of NOTA’s ban on valuable consideration. That Pennsylvania is the only
state to have even tested NOTA’s scope itself suggests that the law may be
having a chilling effect.
In 1994, the Pennsylvania legislature unanimously passed the Burial Benefit
107
Act, which provided modest reimbursement of hospital or burial expenses of
deceased donors—expenses that would have been incurred whether or not the
organs of the deceased were retrieved. Signed into law by then-Governor
Robert P. Casey, Sr., who underwent a heart–liver transplant in 1993, state
authorities said that the act was intended as a “thank you” to the donating
108
family. In fact, the law was inspired by the details of Casey’s circumstance: His
very own donor’s parents needed financial help to cover the burial of their son.
The primary sponsor of Act 102 said that the burial provision was intended to
109
spare other donor families the same financial stress.
The idea of a funeral benefit garnered support. At that time, The American
Medical Association (AMA) engaged the matter through its Council on Ethical
and Judicial Affairs, which concluded in a 1995 statement that forms of financial
incentives that stop short of outright cash payment “may be ethically
110
permissible” and suggested that a pilot study be conducted. In 2008, they
reasserted the legitimacy of studying incentives for deceased donation when the
AMA House of Delegates voted to put the prospect of paying posthumous

107. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8 (1994).
108. See C.L. Bryce et al., Do Incentives Matter? Providing Benefits to Families of Organ Donors, 5
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2999 (2005).
109. See LEGIS. BUDGET & FIN. COMM., A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S
ORGAN AND TISSUE DONOR AWARENESS PROGRAM CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO HR-698 OF 2006,
at S-8 (2007), available at http://lbfc.legis.state.pa.us/reports/2007/291.PDF [hereinafter LB&FC
REPORT].
110. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Financial Incentives for Organ
Procurement: Ethical Aspects of Future Contracts for Cadaveric Donors, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 581, 587 (1995).

8_SATEL_MORRISON_JONES_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2014]

1/31/2015 12:48 PM

STATE ORGAN-DONATION INCENTIVES

241

111

organ donors high on its legislative agenda.
Pennsylvania’s act established the Organ Donation Awareness Trust Fund
112
to which state residents could contribute. It authorized use of 10 percent of
that fund to defray medical or funeral expenses of the deceased, with an upper
limit of $3000 for any one family, although at the time of creation the fund was
113
only large enough to offer $300 to each family of the 400 anticipated donors.
From 1994 to 1999, the Pennsylvania legislature invested significant financial
and community resources in studying whether Act 102 would conflict with
114
federal law. Despite support for pilot studies from groups like the National
Kidney Foundation (NKF) and the AMA, the legal counsel to the State
Department of Health believed that it would violate NOTA’s prohibition on
115
the transfer of organs for “valuable consideration.” The Pennsylvania funeral
benefit therefore stalled in the final stage, lacking only a signature from the
116
state secretary of health. The state sought clarification of this question from
117
the DOJ, but received none. Finally, the Pennsylvania Department of Health
decided not to test the limits of NOTA and instead directed the funds intended
for incentives away from funeral expenses for the deceased and toward
reimbursement for food, travel, lodging, and lost wages incurred by living
118
donors—reimbursements explicitly permitted under NOTA section 301(c)(2).
Subsequent efforts to revive the funeral benefit failed. In March 2000,
counsel from an OPO in Pennsylvania made an impassioned plea to the
department of health’s chief counsel to implement the funeral-expense pilot

111. See Kevin B. O’Reilly, AMA Meeting: Delegates Seek to Change Law on Organ Donor
Incentives, AM. MED. NEWS (July 7, 2008), http://www.amednews.com/article/20080707/profession/
307079949/7/.
112. See Christopher Snowbeck, Committee Approves Plan to Reward Families for Relatives’ Organ
Donations, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 10, 1999, at B7.
113. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pennsylvania Set to Break Taboo on Reward for Organ Donations,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at A1. Financial constraints aside, $300 was coincidentally the amount
deemed ethically sound by a panel of consultant bioethicists convened by the Pennsylvania physician
general in 1999 on the order of Pennsylvania secretary of health. The amount, the bioethicists decided,
fell below a level they believed would be an inducement to donate, yet still represented a gratuitous
gesture. LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 116.
114. LB&FC Report, supra note 109, at 111–12. Key components of Act 102 are (1) to increase the
requirements placed on hospitals regarding the organ donation process, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8617
(2006), (2) to increase public awareness of organ donation, id. § 8622(b)(3), (3) to establish a fifteenmember Organ Donation Advisory Committee, id. § 8622(c), and (4) to create the Governor Robert P.
Casey Memorial Organ and Tissue Donation Awareness Trust Fund, id. § 8622(a). Act 102 was
amended in 2000 to rename the trust fund after Governor Casey who died in 2000. See Act of Dec. 20,
2000, Pub. L. No. 2000-120 (codified as amended at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8622(a)).
115. LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 116.
116. Interview with Howard Nathan, President & CEO, Gift of Life Donor Program, in
Philadelphia, Pa. (Sept 17, 2007).
117. Christopher Snowbeck, Organ Donor Funeral Aid Scrapped, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
February 1, 2002, at B1.
118. See Robert Arnold et al., Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An Ethical
Reappraisal, 73 TRANSPLANTATION 1361, 1366 (2002).
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program. The OPO counsel argued that the NOTA prohibition is limited to
the selling of organs for profit and that “it is inconsistent with the express
language of [NOTA], as well as the legislative history, to broaden the
prohibition well beyond its express words to somehow prohibit the
120
reimbursement of a portion of the funeral expenses of an organ donor.” The
counsel further underscored that, as a criminal statute, NOTA section 301(a)
“should be strictly construed and strictly limited to pure commercial
121
transactions in human organs.” “To do otherwise ‘would violate the basic
tenets of statutory construction and criminalize conduct that [was] never
122
expressly addressed.’” But the state department of health refused to seek
federal guidance, insisting that a proposed pilot trial of burial benefits would
123
violate NOTA.
On a number of occasions in 2003 and again in 2004, the Pennsylvania
Organ Donation Advisory Committee raised the subject of the funeral-expense
124
pilot. By March 2006, the advisory committee had developed another
proposal for funeral benefits but the secretary of health concluded that the
committee should instead work with OPOs to develop a proposal for a pilot
125
study of reimbursement for grief-counseling expenses.
In 2007, the Pennsylvania General Assembly undertook an evaluation of the
state’s Organ and Tissue Donor Awareness Program, including the funeral
126
benefit allowed for by Act 102. The report concluded that “there are
indications that a [funeral benefit] proposal could be crafted that would not
violate [NOTA]” and recommended as follows:
The [Pennsylvania] Department of Health should take steps to determine the legality,
under federal law, of a funeral expense benefit for donor families that is authorized in
state law and that the Organ Donation Advisory Committee has twice proposed to the
Department as a pilot project. Specifically, the Department should reassess—in light
of the recent federal Department of Justice opinion relating to kidney exchange
programs and its analysis of valuable consideration under NOTA Section 301—
whether implementing a pilot funeral benefit program as required by Act 102
necessarily involves buying and selling, or an otherwise commercial transfer of organs
that “clearly and definitely” is encompassed by NOTA’s prohibition on the transfer of
127
human organs for valuable consideration.

As of 2010 no action had been taken by the Pennsylvania Department of Health

119. LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 116.
120. Id. at 117.
121. LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 126.
122. Id.
123. See id.
124. LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at 117.
125. Organ
Donation
Grief
Counseling
Program,
PA.
DEP’T
HEALTH,
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/organ_donation_awareness/18861/organ_dona
tion_grief_counseling_program/830747 (last visited Mar. 10, 2014).
126. H.R. Res. 698, 2006 Gen. Assemb. (Pa. 2006); see LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at S-8, S-9.
127. See LB&FC REPORT, supra note 109, at S-31. More specifically, the report recommended that
the department of health examine the prospect for funeral benefits again, issue an opinion on moving
forward, and develop a written proposal for doing so. Id. at S-31.
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128

on these recommendations. The Pennsylvania experience with state-benefit
programs confirms that clarification of NOTA section 301 would be beneficial,
regardless of whether or not NOTA section 301 is currently being properly
interpreted. States need more clarity so they can better address the organ
shortage.
IV
THE LIMITATIONS OF CONCRETE APPLICATION
As stated above, reasonable state incentives provided to increase organ
donation, if not clearly and definitely commercial, should be allowable under
the language and intent of NOTA section 301(a). Pragmatically speaking,
however, there are realistic restraints on the boldness of the inducements that
can be offered. For example, are incentives of $100, $1000, and $1 million in
value equally acceptable? Is a direct cash payment as acceptable as a tax benefit
or a funeral reimbursement? There are likely limits on a benefit’s amount and
structure at which a reasonable person would believe that a donation was
requested and accomplished in exchange for the delivery of the state benefit—
indicating that a business-type inducement occurred, akin to a clear commercial
activity. For example, the closer a state incentive’s value is to the fair market
value of an organ, the greater the chance that the incentive would be regarded
as being at or near a market-type transaction and, thus, contrary to NOTA. The
more direct a benefit would be, the more risk the transaction would be viewed
as being openly bargained for, similar to a commercial endeavor. The less the
incentive is crafted to underscore a noncommercial, public-policy purpose and
intent, the greater risk it would be perceived as analogous to pursuing a
commercial effect. The purpose of this article is to argue that state incentives
should be allowed by NOTA at some level—not to debate the scope of their
limits. Ultimately, the door to state incentives should be opened, but the limits
on incentives will and should be found by way of the federalist approach
advocated herein, through which varying state legal regimes will be used as
laboratories to test change in this area and help measure useful and harmful
features of that change.
V
STATUTORY CLARIFICATION
Because—as the Pennsylvania experience shows—states continue to
question whether section 301 prohibits state-benefit programs, and, as a result,
states remain reluctant to challenge the ban, clarification needs to be achieved
regarding NOTA section 301(a). This should occur either by obtaining an
official opinion from the DOJ that definitively interprets the law in the context

128. See ORGAN DONATION ADVISORY COMM., THE PENNSYLVANIA ORGAN AND TISSUE
DONATION ACTION PLAN 2010, at 16 (2010), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/
document/924960/2010organtissuedonationactionplan_pdf.
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of state incentive programs or by amending the law. A request should be made
by the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services to the DOJ Office of Legal
Counsel to advise on the legality of public policy–driven state incentive
programs that promote organ donation, similar to what was done in the area of
paired exchanges. Moreover, Congress should amend NOTA to exempt such
state-benefit arrangements. Indeed, statutory amendment may be most
beneficial in any event to definitively remove uncertainty on the issue and to
speed the process of change.
There are two basic options for statutory reform. The first entails revising
the term “valuable consideration” to exempt incentives for organ donation that
are provided by a state or state-related entity. A second option is for Congress
to give HHS or the DOJ authority to grant states waivers to conduct pilot trials
of state-sponsored incentives for living or posthumous donation. Alternatively,
the DOJ might be persuaded to agree to allow narrowly tailored pilot trials to
go forward in light of the current felony provision, particularly if the
Department believed the current law was ambiguous.
Since 1981, bills have been introduced to amend NOTA to allow tax
deductions and tax credits for deceased donation and life-insurance policies for
129
living donors. None has been successful. In 1981 Representative Philip T.
Crane of Illinois introduced a bill that would have offered tax incentives for
transplantable organs from deceased donors. House Bill 3774 proposed “a
$25,000 deduction on the [donor’s] last taxable year plus a $25,000 exclusion
from estate taxes,” with the same incentives going to the family of a child
130
donor. In 1999, Representative James Greenwood of Pennsylvania introduced
House Bill 3471 in order “to authorize the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to carry out demonstration projects to increase the supply of organs
131
donated for human transplantation.” The bill would have allowed projects to
establish financial incentives for organ donation, including payments for the
132
purchase of life-insurance policies or annuities, payable to a donor’s designee.
In 2000 and 2001, Representative Christopher Smith of New Jersey introduced
the Help Organ Procurement Expand Act, which would have provided a $2500
tax credit to individuals who donated their organs while living, or to the
designated beneficiaries or estates of individuals who donated their organs after
133
death. Representative Greenwood subsequently introduced similar bills, in
134
2002 and in July 2003. In 2000 and 2001, Representative James Hansen of
Utah introduced the Gift of Life Tax Credit Act, which would have amended
129. See SATEL, supra note 9, at 141–43.
130. HASTINGS CTR., Tax Incentives: A Market Solution to the Kidney Shortage?, 11 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 3 (1981). The Crane bill was referred to the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on
Health on February 16, 1982 and died in committee.
131. H.R.
2856,
108th
Cong.
(2003),
available
at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c108:H.R.2856.IH.
132. Id.
133. H.R. 2090, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 5436, 106th Cong. (2000).
134. H.R. 2856, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 5224, 107th Cong. (2002).
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the Internal Revenue Code to allow a (refundable) $10,000 credit to individuals
135
who donated their organs at death.
In 1993, the NKF proposed that NOTA be changed to permit payments of burial
expenses for donors. Its spokesperson suggested that a “standardized and small”
amount, perhaps $2000, be given through an agency within HHS to “a third party
136
like a funeral director.” (Inexplicably, now, over two decades later, the
foundation is opposed to any proposals for donor enrichment, even though the
organ shortage is currently far worse than when the NKF first endorsed pilot
137
trials. ) A 1993 white paper by UNOS deemed incentives for deceased
donation “ethically justifiable only if found preferable to the other feasible
138
options to increase donations.” (Again in 2002, UNOS reiterated its call for
139
pilot studies of incentives for posthumous donation. ) As noted earlier, the
American Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
concluded in a 1995 statement that forms of financial incentives that stop short
of outright cash payment “may be ethically permissible” and suggests that a
140
pilot study be conducted.
In 1999, the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Health and
Environment, of the Committee on Commerce, held a hearing entitled Putting
141
Patients First: Increasing Organ Supply for Transplantation. Representative
James Greenwood of Pennsylvania proposed a federally funded, $10,000 lifeinsurance policy for everyone in the United States, with benefits payable upon
donation and transplantation of the deceased’s organs. Witnesses at the hearing
were fairly unanimous in their approval of these proposed deceased-donor
incentive programs, particularly if they might serve as pilot studies for broader
135. The credit would presumably go to the deceased individual’s beneficiaries or estate. When the
bill was proposed in 2000 it had twenty-two cosponsors, but it only had five in 2001. Both times it was
immediately referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means, and no further action was taken.
H.R. 1872, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 4048, 106th Cong. (2000).
136. Organ Transplant and Bone Marrow Donor Reauthorization: Hearing before the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t, 103d Cong. 157 (1993) (statement of A. Bruce
Bowden, Vice Chairman, National Kidney Foundation).
137. See Assessing Initiatives to Increase Organ Donations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the Comm. On Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. 51–54 (2003)
[hereinafter Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations].
138. EDWARD W. NELSON, UNOS ETHICS COMM., FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN
DONATION: A REPORT OF THE UNOS ETHICS PAYMENT SUBCOMMITTEE (1993), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4.
139. See OPTN/UNOS Board Endorses Studies of Incentives to Increase Donation, TRANSPLANT
LIVING (June 28, 2002), http://transplantliving.org/community/newsroom/2002/06/optn-unos-boardendorses-studies-of-incentives-to-increase-donation/.
140. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, supra note 110.
141. Putting Patients First: Increasing Organ Supply for Transplantation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health & Env’t, of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 58 (1999). Joseph L. Brand,
Chairman of the Office of Scientific and Public Policy at the National Kidney Foundation stated, “We
have looked at this issue with our constituents and the bottom line is, we would support at least a pilot
study on financial incentives.” Id. He went on, “Financial incentives, if we have any data that says they
are working, we ought to try them elsewhere. So we certainly would support that . . . . The National
Kidney Foundation has long called for demonstration projects to determine the impact of programs
which would assist donor families in paying for funeral or burial expenses.” Id.
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initiatives. The NKF expressed its support: “We are not talking about a
situation where the organ goes to the highest bidder, or that there should
be market for organs. We are talking about a limited, specified amount of
142
money paid to a third party.” According to a spokesman for the American
Society of Transplantation, that organization would be in favor of “carrying out
creative pilot studies to explore the possibility that quite modest financial
supports may enhance organ donation,” such as that offered by the
143
Pennsylvania program. The president of the American Society of Transplant
Surgeons (ASTS), also commenting on the Pennsylvania program, suggested
that “if you would have asked this question 25 years ago . . . it would have been
an absolute no . . . . but I think you have got to look at this again and again and
144
145
again . . . .” He later confirmed, “I personally see no ethical issue.” John R.
Campbell, executive director of the Lifelink Foundation (an OPO serving
Florida, Georgia, and Puerto Rico) said, “We believe this will provide the organ
donation and transplantation community an opportunity to view Pennsylvania
as a pilot state for the rest of the nation . . . . If rates of donation increase, we
146
may want to consider a similar initiative.”
In 2003, another congressional hearing was held to discuss strategies to
increase the organ supply. A hearing entitled Assessing Initiatives to Increase
Organ Donations was conducted before the House’s Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, of the Committee on Energy and Commerce.
Although strong objections were proffered against the use of direct monetary
incentives to procure organs, many witnesses endorsed funeral support. The
AMA representative, for example, encouraged “the medical community to
147
support the reexamination of motivation for cadaveric organ donation,” as did
148
the president of the ASTS, who testified about continuing interest in studying
“various methods and programs to increase donation rates that may have a
financial component,” such as offering “a modest funeral expense benefit to the
family of a decedent donor, not as a payment for a donated organ, but as a
149
token of thanks.” In their presidential addresses, ASTS Presidents in 2006 and
2007 explicitly endorsed pilot trials of incentives for organ donation—both
150
living and posthumous.
142. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pennsylvania Set to Break Taboo on Rewards for Organ Donations,
N.Y.TIMES, May 6, 1999, at Al.
143. Putting Patients First: Increasing Organ Supply for Transplantation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Health & Env’t, of the Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 80 (1999).
144. Id. at 58.
145. Id. at 74.
146. Id. at 65. LifeLink’s strategies involved simplifying the donation process, improving the
training of hospital employees who approach bereaved families for donor organs, and establishing a
strong liaison program between hospitals and organ-procurement organizations. Id. at 14.
147. Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 53–54.
148. Id. at 62.
149. Id. at 58 (statement of Abraham Shaked, President, American Society of Transplant
Surgeons).
150. See Richard N. Fine, Presidential Address at the 2006 World Transplant Congress (July 19,
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When asked by Representative Greenwood what they thought of incentives,
the president-elect of the Association of Organ Procurement Organizations
151
(AOPO) stated that the AOPO would support pilot projects for incentives,
and the president-elect of UNOS said his organization “in essence . . . backed
152
the AMA stance.” That same year, the AMA issued a report encouraging
pilot trials of incentives for posthumous donation. The report mentioned
funeral benefits as well as tax credits to the donor’s estate or a payment to a
153
charity designated by the donor prior to death. Oddly, the NKF became
opposed to the proposed initiatives, saying that “[a]ny attempt to assign a
monetary value to the human body or its body parts, even in the hope of
increasing organ supply, diminishes human dignity and devaluates the very
154
human life we seek to save.”
In 2002, the Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation (ACOT) of the
Department of Health and Human Services, whose role is to assist the HHS
secretary in “[a]ssuring the public that the [transplant] system is as effective and
155
equitable as possible,” recommended a demonstration project on incentives
156
for deceased donations. During its 2004 meeting, ACOT considered the
legality of fourteen different organ-donation incentive options, one of which
157
was the payment of funeral expenses for deceased donors. The council found
that a funeral-benefit program, although not clearly acceptable under NOTA,
would be an “ideal” study and voted to keep the funeral-benefits concept under
2006), http://www.myast.org/content/richard-n-fine-md-2006-presidential-address (“Is it wrong for an
individual . . . who wishes to utilize part of his/her body for the benefit of another and in return will be
provided with financial compensation that could obliterate a life of destitution for the individual and
his/her family?”). Jeffrey Crippen of the American Society of Transplantation and Arthur Matas of the
ASTS indicated support for financial-incentive trials in their presidential addresses at the Second
World Transplant Congress. See Anthony Monaco, Financial Rewards for Organ Donation: Are We
Getting Closer? 7 EXPERT REV. PHARMACOECONOMICS & OUTCOMES RES. 303 (2007). A poll taken
at the annual meeting of the ASTS suggests considerable support for Fine’s sentiments, revealing that
eighty to eighty-five percent of members were in favor of studying incentives for living donors. J.R.
Rodrigue et al., Stimulus for Organ Donation: A Survey of the American Society of Transplant
Surgeons, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2172 (2009).
151. Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 22–23.
152. Id. at 43.
153. See FRANK A. RIDDICK, JR., REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS
3 (2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/2151a.pdf. The report
also stated that “AMA policy has supported certain forms of financial incentives for cadaveric organ
donation since 1993.” Id. at 1.
154. Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 51–54.
155. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, Mission and Meeting-Notes Archive of the Advisory
Committee
on
Organ
Transplantation,
ORGANDONOR.GOV,
http://organdonor.gov/legislation/advisory.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
156. Jim Warren, ACOT Recommends Set of Live Donor Standards; Spotlight Now on HHS
Secretary Thompson’s Response, TRANSPLANT NEWS, Nov. 27, 2002, at P1. The ethics committee of the
ASTS was in favor of a token reward to families who donate; this offer was explicitly meant as a “thank
you,” not an inducement. See Jim Warren, ASTS Ethics Committee Endorses Pilot Program to Test a
Financial Incentive to Increase Organ Donation, TRANSPLANT NEWS, May 28, 2002, at P1.
157. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Summary Meeting Notes from May 2004 Meeting,
ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/legislation/acotmay2004notes.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2014) [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Summary Meeting Notes].
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consideration. It concluded that “clarification and greater specificity [was
needed] in regard to the broad and somewhat confusing prohibition of valuable
158
consideration in the context of organ donation.”
Notably, ACOT recommended amending NOTA to give HHS discretion in
159
further defining “valuable consideration.” It also noted that, “[r]egulatory
authority is both more flexible and more responsive to innovation than an
expanded statutory list of practices that are not included in the term ‘valuable
160
consideration.’” The committee concluded “that a process to limit the scope
of ‘valuable consideration’ would encourage the development of ethical
practices to increase the supply of human organs and provide certainty to the
161
transplant community about the scope of permissible activities.”
The council also listed the serious consequences of lack of clarity on the
meaning of the term “valuable consideration.” They included,
“Uncertainty about federal preemption of state law could deter state legislative action
to create incentives intended to increase organ donation[;]
Risk of criminal prosecution for innovative programs that provide incentives to
increase donation[;]
Federal preemption of state laws that create incentives to enhance
donation on the
162
grounds that the state law conflicts with the federal prohibition.”

In 2008, the AMA reasserted the legitimacy of studying incentives for
deceased donation. The AMA House of Delegates voted in June to put the
prospect of paying posthumous organ donors “high on its legislative agenda,”
though the association appears to have done little to promote it among
163
legislators. But the most far-reaching proposal yet came when the late Senator
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania circulated a draft bill in 2008–2009, the Organ
Donor Clarification Act, “to clarify that laws that honor and reward organ
donation are not preempted by Federal criminal law and acceptance of such
164
government benefits is not criminal.” Notably, the Specter proposal was not
limited to deceased donation. The key language of his bill, which was never
submitted, is as follows:
The Federal and state governments enjoy constitutional powers to provide benefits
that honor, reward, and encourage benevolent behavior deemed to be in the general
welfare and public interest. The exercise of these sovereign powers to provide a
benefit to those citizens who voluntarily donate the gift of life to fellow citizens is not
commercial in nature, it does not constitute a commercial sales transaction, and it does
not violate Federal law if a government program provides benefits, including, but not
limited to, burial benefits, ‘‘gift of life’’ medals, tax credits for donors, tax credits for
employers who pay lost wages, tax deductions, discounts or waivers of drivers’ license
158. Id.
159. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Recommendations 36-41 from November 2004 Meeting,
ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/legislation/acotrecs3641.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Summary Meeting Notes, supra note 157.
163. Kevin B. O’Reilly, AMA Meeting: Delegates Seek to Change Law on Organ Donor Incentives,
AM. MED. NEWS, (July 7, 2008), http://www.amednews.com/article/20080707/profession/307079949/7/.
164. Organ Donation Clarification and Antitrafficking Act of 2008, 111th Cong (2008).
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fees, comprehensive health care for life, health and life insurance, disability and
survivor benefits, a financial contribution to a charity of the donor’s choosing, the
numerous benefits provided to veterans such as college tuition, or preference on the
transplant waiting list for an individual who has donated an organ.

Any government program that provides a benefit to honor, reward, and
encourage organ donation should be devised and implemented in a manner
consistent with the federal regulations that establish procurement, allocation,
165
and transplantation protocols to prevent abuse, exploitation, or coercion.
An amendment to NOTA could extend exclusion from the definition to any
in-kind material benefits provided by federal, state, or local government to an
organ donor. Such a revision would create no federal mandate or allocation. It
would simply open the door to states to experiment, a development that almost
came to fruition in Pennsylvania. What is more, it would allow Congress to
specify what the limits are on state programs, rather than having administrators,
policymakers, and lawmakers guess about how courts will interpret the term
“consideration.”
As discussed above, one amendment to NOTA has been adopted. In 2007,
Congress enacted the Charlie W. Norwood Living Organ Donation Act to
amend section 301 so that it explicitly exempted paired donations. If paired
donations do not involve monetary compensation, they nonetheless enter into
quid pro quo territory. Legal scholar Sherry Colb has argued that “in-kind
markets” are already legal in the form of kidney swaps, arrangements that
represent the exchange of kidneys for valuable things. In the case of paired
166
exchange, that valuable thing happens to be a kidney. After all, she has
argued, kidney swaps are driven by self-interest, not altruism. Should the fact
that the currency in a paired exchange is compatible kidneys—rather than a tax
credit, tuition voucher, or retirement supplement—place such exchanges in a
completely different ethical category from ordinary market events? Colb has
described two hypothetical women. First, there is Cathy—who seeks to
exchange her kidney for a monetary reward, which she will use to pay for her
husband’s life-saving surgery. And then Carla, who is biologically incompatible
with her own husband but donates a compatible kidney to a recipient of another
unmatched pair recipient (whose donor then gives his compatible kidney to
Carla’s husband) thereby saving Carla’s spouse from dialysis and premature
death. Carla cannot get her husband the kidney he needs with cash, so she uses
her own kidney as currency instead. In both cases, a woman is giving a stranger
a kidney that she would otherwise keep inside her own body. “In both cases,”
Colb has written, “she is doing so because she prefers to part with a kidney than
167
with her husband.”
Even beyond the paired donations allowed by the Norwood Act, newer
165. Id. at § 2.
166. See Sherry F. Colb, Donor Chains and the Legality of Compensating Kidney Donors: Critically
Assessing Our Moral Intuitions, VERDICT (March 7, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/03/07/donorchains-and-the-legality-of-compensating-kidney-donors.
167. Id.
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arrangements, known as NEAD (nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic, donor)
chains, might also be made available. Such chains comprise a number of
unmatched pairs plus a nondirected altruistic donor, a stranger or good
samaritan, who offers a kidney to someone chosen not by the donor but by the
local transplant center or OPO. The nondirected donation kicks off a chain of
transplants between the nonmatched pairs that may take many months to
complete. The concept behind NEAD chains is that donors “pay it forward”
168
after their loved one receives a transplant. Kieran Healy and Kimberly D.
Krawiec situate NEAD chains in between a cascade of gift-giving and a
sequence of formal contracts. Like swaps, chains rely on a norm of reciprocity,
yet at the same time they “resemble a string of promises and commitments to
deliver something in exchange for some valuable consideration – that is, a series
169
of contracts,” as Healy and Krawiec put it.
In some respects, the Norwood Act was a bigger change to NOTA than a
possible amendment authorizing funeral benefits. Paired donation is clearly a
conditional arrangement in which a donor would never agree to act if a second
donor did not promise to act as well. Then again, swaps and chains do not
resemble commercial exchanges insofar as money is not being exchanged and
all participants came to the swap arrangements because they possessed donative
intent; that is, they were initially fully prepared to engage in a standard altruistic
donation. However, whether or not the Norwood Act allows exchanges that are
more or less commercial than state-benefit programs, does not affect the
bottom line: State-benefit programs are consistent with NOTA section 301, and
the section should be amended to make this clear.
VI
CONCLUSION
There likely does exist a realistic limit to the scope of any potential state
benefit past which the state would be viewed as engaging in a business-type
inducement contrary to the intent of NOTA. But reasonable benefits that are
given by state governments to promote a policy of encouraging organ donation
should not be interpreted as violating NOTA because these benefits are not
clearly and definitively commercial and, as such, do not constitute “valuable
consideration” as that term is commonly defined within the law.
The legislative intent or policy rationales driving NOTA also do not counsel
any different result. Much to the contrary, Congress’s intent in passing NOTA
was to ban commercial exchanges of organs like those proposed by H. Barry

168. Michael A. Rees et al., A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain, 360 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1096 (2009). Because the operations do not take place simultaneously, as they do with organ
swaps, a concern is whether the donor half of an unmatched pair might renege on his or her promise to
donate once the partner has already received a kidney. For discussion of contracting for damages as a
way to foster commitment among participants, see Kieran Healy & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom,
Contract, and Kidney Exchange, 62 DUKE L.J. 645 (2012).
169. Id. at 645.
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Jacobs—not to prohibit state-benefit programs. Similarly, the policy rationales
underlying NOTA are not implicated by state-benefit programs.
Canons of statutory construction further support reading NOTA section 301
narrowly, thereby allowing for state-benefit programs. Inasmuch as NOTA
section 301(a)’s ban is enforceable through criminal penalties, it should be read
narrowly because the full scope of its meaning is not clearly evident from
NOTA itself. State benefits for organ donation should not be interpreted to
violate NOTA because federalism requires that leeway should be given and
courts should be reluctant to preempt state authority in devising public-policy
driven efforts to provide benefits to organ donors. Federalist analysis informs
the NOTA question not just as part of a statutory canon, but also as a wider
normative lens.
The DOJ’s treatment of NOTA in the paired exchange context supports all
that has been said above. The primary enforcer of NOTA section 301 has read
that section narrowly.
Of course, refreshing the statutory analysis of NOTA does little to solve the
on-the-ground confusion in interpreting the law. Pennsylvania provides the test
case. There, fear that NOTA banned state-benefit programs eventually scuttled
an ambitious funeral-voucher program. To avoid this result in the future, an
official interpretation should be acquired from the DOJ, or NOTA should be
amended to expressly allow for state benefits.
One final piece of supporting evidence: Both the public and experts are in
favor of donor compensation. Polls and surveys reveal four trends: (1) among
the general public, the majority either endorses in-kind donor rewards or is
neutral; (2) the number of people who report that incentives make donation
appear more attractive to them outnumber those who say that an incentive
option would make them less likely to donate; (3) youthful cohorts are more
receptive to incentives than their older counterparts; and (4) the public is more
170
amenable to the idea than are medical professionals. In addition, many
interest groups have endorsed the idea of pilot studies on government benefits
171
to encourage organ donation. They include the HHS’s ACOT; UNOS; the
172
AOPO; the American Association of Kidney Patients; the American Society
173
174
of Transplantation; ASTS; and the AMA. However, none of these entities
have pressed the matter or made it a priority.
As a matter of historical significance, Representative Al Gore raised the
175
possibility of incentives when he introduced NOTA in July 1983. It is also
170. See supra note 12 and sources cited therein.
171. Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at22–23, 84.
172. Interview of Thomas Peters, Member, AAKP Board of Directors (June 10, 2008).
173. Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight & Investigations, supra note 137, at 84.
174. See Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, Financial Incentives Could Improve Organ Donation and
Reduce Donor-Recipient Gap (June 16, 2008), available at http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/financial-incentives-could-improve-organ-donation-and-reduce-donor-recipient-gap57471977.html.
175. Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t, supra note 41, at 9–10
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noteworthy that he added section 301 not because of a deeply held belief that
incentives were wrong, but because of the unhappy coincidence of his
committee’s hearings on the bill with the sensational negative publicity
attending the startup of an organ-brokerage firm in Virginia. But for that twist
of fate, the middle ground between outright prohibition and unregulated
markets would already have been sown with organ donor compensation
programs, and tens of thousands of lives might have been saved in the last
quarter century by an adequate supply of organs generated by appropriate
financial incentives.

(statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.). A bill to authorize the HHS secretary to carry out demonstration
projects to increase the supply of organs donated for human transplantation, H.R. 2856, 108th Cong.
(2003), had the support of no Republicans and five Democrats. Cosponsors were representatives
Donna M. Christensen (D-VI), Martin Frost (D-TX), Rush D. Holt, (D-NJ), Donald M. Payne, (DNJ), and Vic Snyder (D-AR).

